Wednesday, October 29, 2008


THE LTTE did it yet again. Their tincans managed to attack SLDF in Manar and fly all the way to Colombo unchallenged and drop two bombs on the Kelanitissa power station at night.

In order to achieved such a feat, they needed precise planning, ample training, the right equipment and plenty of guts. Obviously the LTTE lacked none of it, and their execution of the attack bore the hallmarks of dedication and descipline.

The planners of this attack were obviously capable of thinking outside the box, had studied the counter-strike strategies of the SL Forces and relied on the same routine being followed this time too. In hindsight it now appears that the LTTE planners' gamble paid off and allowed their aircraft to escape unscathed as a result. Thier proven ingenuity and daring more than compensated for the lack of state of the art gizmos the SLAF usually needs to carry out an air strike in LTTE territory.

The LTTE aircraft obviously took off from an area quite close to the SLDF dominated areas, flew low to avoid detection and struck the military targets in Mannar. As this attack progressed, the SLDF would have been anticipating a potential ground attack to coincide, while the aircraft escaped towards the Vanni. Guessing that any airborne counter-measures such as the F7Gs or K8 interceptors would also fly towards the Wanni in search of the Tiger aircraft, the intruders easily flew over to Colombo, flying in the opposite direction. The two bombs dropped by them within the Kelanitissa power station did some damage to two standby generators, yet failed to cause significant economic damage. Nevertheless it achieved part of its goal, causing some damage to SLG property while generating some of the badly needed morale boost for to the violent Tamil diaspora overseas.

The SLAF has for long enjoyed a position of priviledge and also has proven the least capable of our forces when it came to defensive action. The number of botched situations are now reaching unaceptable proportions. The SLAF's defensive readiness needs to be re-evaluated and corrective action initiated promptly.

The Sri Lankan defence establishment also needs to re-evaluate its air defence capabilities in depth and restructure where needed. Adding expensive equipment is not the solution to failed leadership and management skills, which are staring us in the face. We already possess everything that is needed, and more. The Air Force needs to be a part of the solution and not a part of the problem any longer. If all other measures fail, removing or re-structuring the leadership of the SLAF may be the only option left to the Sri Lankan government.


History said...

accurate analysis.. great job TS

Foxtrott said...

What a sad state of affairs........agree with the analisis in most cases.......

SLAF highrachy is cirtainly responsible .......for this disgracefull line of events.....

The F7 pilots need to read a lot more and be focused on their job read read...."Murphys law is a reality"....things went wrong cause we did not anticipatethe determination of the TAF pilots ( definetly mercernaries who probably are over 50 years old and has real good information on SLAF capabilities and the inferior thinking capacity of some of its defence stratergists)
Director Opperations should be held accountable for failure of the its he who is directly responsible for the implimenting this. Commander should take blame for sure as he should lead from the from the front Gen SF of the Army and RA WK of the NAVY.

He should reward the performers and sideline the medioacure officers who just go up the ladder for their seniority. This stratergy has worked perfectly in the Army and the NAVY very well.